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THE LAWLESS LAW OF NATIONS
THE LAWLESS LAW OF NATIONS.
By STERLING E. EDMUNDS.
CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
All modern authorities on The Law of Nations affirm that
no such body of law did or could exist prior to the Peace of
Westphalia, in 1648, which, ending the Thirty Years' War,
ushered in the modern European Sates system by confirming
the independence and Sovereignty of nearly four hundred
distinct absolute political entities.' There were nations before
that time, to be sure, but The Law of Nations, as had been
pointed out, is not a law of nations, but a law of Sovereign
States; and not until this large group of autocrats arose
was there any other comparable community to be found on
the earth's surface. Nothing is vouchsafed to us whence the
Protestant princes who met at Osnaburg and the Catholic
princes who met at Munster, to conclude this Peace, derived
their authority to confirm Sovereignty in any or all of the
European States, though we are told by Oppenhe i 2 that it
was "the first time in history a European Congress assembled
for the purpose of settling matters international by common
1. Oppenhelm I, Chap. II, 54, 56. See Wheaton, History of the Law of
Nations (p. 72), who says:
The Constitution of the Germanic empire, as finally adjusted by the
Peace of Westphalia, formed a singularly complicated political struc-
ture. It was composed of no less than three hundred and fifty-five
different sovereign states of various descriptions, feudal, ecclesiastical
and municipal, of unequal extent and relative importance. Among
these were one hundred and ifty secular states, possessed and ruled
by hereditary electors, dukes, landgraves, marquisses, counts and bur-
graves; one hundred and twenty-three ecclesiastical states ruled by
electors, archbishops, bishops. abbots, the grand masters of military
orders of knighthood, priors and abbesses, chosen for life; and of
sixty-two imperial cities governed as republics.
2. Int. Law, I, Sec. 43.
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consent of the Powers." Perhaps "the Powers" did not
actually confirm or confer Sovereignty upon these States,
but merely recognized it as a visible fact in the absolute
character which the States uniformly possessed in the persons
of their despotic rulers. At any rate, all were Sovereign
and in the treaties of recognition we find the confirmation
running not to the peoples but to their respective Emperors,
Kings, Princes, Dukes and other hereditary and unaccount-
able rulers.8
In spite of the unanimity of so-called authorities on this
point, however, it is discernible from history that, as early as
the fourth century before Christ, the Greeks were practicing
a system that has all the earmarks of a Law of Nations. with
the modern Sovereign State left out. Thus it comprised such
subjects as naturalization, status of aliens, traveling and
domiciled; consuls, asylums, extradition, immunity of ambas-
sadors, treaties and alliances, colonies, balance of power, inter-
vention, arbitration, causes of war, declaration, truces and
armistices, ransom of prisoners, spies, hostages, reprisals,
immunity of temples, burial of war dead, maritime jurisdic-
tion, shipwreck, embargo and blockade.4
In spite of the God-given character of the Greek state, as
humanity perfected,5 we find no hard and fast qualification
of this law as applicable to Sovereign States only, nor do they
term it International law, or The Law of Nations; their phi-
losophers do describe it, however, as universal lawO or The
3. De Martens, TPicueil des principaux Traites d'Alliance, etc.
4. 7nternational Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Phil-
lipson I, 63, 64; The Law of Nations, Hosack.
5. Aristotle, Politics III, 9. Sec. 14, 1280b.
6. Aristotle, Rhet. I, 13.
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Law of Nature1 as distinguished from particular law, the
law of any given state. And Aristotle speaks of the universal
law as the unwritten but universally recognized principles of
morality.8  Again, in referring to the universal or natural
law, he says law is reason unaffected by desire.9
It is obvious, therefore, that while modern authorities may
be correct in saying the prevailing system of The Law of
Nations was unknown to the ancients, the Greeks ordered their
relations with other peoples according to a fairly definite
system, though their philosophers conceived it to flow from
Nature, morality or reason, rather than from the unaccount-
able power of Sovereign States.
Turning next to Rome, as the successor to Greece in the
political and cultural dominance of the world, we observe that
while the jus civilis, or the written law of the Roman citizen,
was ever expanding through the various methods of legislation
peculiar to them, quite a different system was developing to
regulate their relations with aliens, or peregrini, slave and
free, and of aliens with each other, who increasingly flocked
to Rome as the frontiers of conquest were widened. Aliens
in Rome were excluded from the privileges of the Roman law
but the necessities of trade and peaceful intercourse and of
order, made some common ground of adjustment imperative.
In the theory and practice of the times law was wholly
personal, and the Roman citizen, as we know in the experience
7. Sophocles, Antig. II, 456-7.
8. Rhet. I, 10.
9. Politics III, 16, 5.
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of the Apostle Paul° in Jeritsalem, carried his law with him
wherever he might go. So, too, the Goth, the Lombard, the
Burgundian, the Tuscan, the Umbrian, the Carthaginian, and
others, coming to Rome had each his separate law. To meet
this condition of conflict of laws, the Romans instituted a
new magistracy in 247 B. C., whom they entitled the Praetor
Peregrinus, to distinguish him from their own legislator-
judge, the Praetor Urbanus. It was through this office that
there was slowly evolved a distinct body of law known as the
jus gentium,--The Law of the Nations,--which grew and was
applied until the extension of citizenship to- all subjects of
the Empire by the Edict of Caracalla, between 212 and 217
A. D. rendered it no longer necessary or useful. 1 It em-
braced not only private international law, but public inter-
national law as well, including the jus fetiale, dealing mainly
with the practices of war.
The most significant characteristic of jus gentium was its
reconciliation of the laws of many other peoples with those
of Rome, and the basis was the existence in all systems of
customs and principles more or less common to all; or, as
10. Acts XXI, XXII. This conception ol law as personal still svrtives
in states of continental Europe; especially do we see it in their criminal law
where home courts are vested with jurisdiction 'of crimes of subjects, wher-
ever committed, on the subject's return to the territory. The Anglo4kmerl-
can doctrine is, however, that criminal jurisdiction is coextensive with the
territory only.--ED.
11. It must not -be thought that this apparently liberal measure was
dictated by any generous sentiment; its simple purpose was to produce more
revenue for which the soldleis were always clamoring, more or less threat.
enins1y. Roman citizens, who formerly shared in the plunder ot other
peoples, with the drying up of these sources, were now more and more
heavily taxed. They were subject to an inheritance and legacy tax of five
per cent, from which alien subjects, who were taxed by tribute, were exempt.
When Caracalla transformed all subjects into citizens, he not only raised
the inheritance and legacy tax to ten per cent but continued the exaction of
tribute from the former aliens as of old.-See Gibbon, I, 201-218.
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Bryce remarks, 12 "broadly speaking, the basis or source of the
underlying principles of jus gentium would, as respects com-
mercial matters, be found in good faith and common sense,
and as respects family matters and inheritance, in natural
affection." Though moulded by Roman courts it was viewed
as the essence of the law previously existing among all peoples
and of usages which common sense and the needs of inter-
course required.13 It was, therefore, common to all mankind,
as Gaius tells us, and coeval with the human race itself :14
the law which natural reason had created.' 5 At this point, it
became indistinguishable from the Law of Nature of the
Greeks.
Again, Cicero, who contributed so much to the philosophic
development of law, describes it as "the highest reason, im-
planted in nature, which commands those things which ought
to be done and prohibits the reverse"; as the highest law
"born before all the ages, before any law was written or
State formed"; and, "law did not then begin to be when
put into writing but when it arose at the same moment with
12. History and Jurisprudence, Chap. XI, 575.
13. Institutes, I, 1. Thomas Alfred Walker says in his History of the
Law of Nations, Vol. I, Sec. 29:
In jus gentium, in its more public sense, the Roman approached
most nearly to our modern International Law. But jus gentium, even
in so far as it protected the ambassador, was not in conception law
international; the foundation of the system was community of ob-
servance by men of whatsoever nationality; by men as law-abiding
human beings, not by men of different bodies politic. The Greek tutor
explained this common observance, if the Roman pupil had not him-
self already conceived of some such ascription, by reference to a cer-
tain jus naturale, or a law which Nature herself had implanted in
man, immutable and unchangeable, exact justice, self-evident to the
individual exercising the right reason or the moril faculty with which
he was endowed; but it was the general recognition of this law, its
character as rule acknowledged by all peoples who observed any law,
which first caught the Roman eye.
14. Galus, Dig. XLI, 1, 1.
15. Institutes, I, 1.
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the mind of God.' 0  The jus gentium was more and more
considered as flowing from and embodying the natural law
of mankind, with which there necessarily arose the conception
of natural rights, a consequence that was to exert so profound
an influence on the political condition of mankind in cen-
turies to come.
With the transition of Rome from a temporal power to a
combined temporal and spiritual one, we see a further de-
velopment of the Law of Nature in the hands of scholastic
theologians. All law became then, in theory as well as in
16. De Legit II, 4. Sir Henry Maine, in his Ancient Law, Chap. III,
pp. 51, 52, says:
The oldest Greek philosophers have been accustomed to explain the
fabric of creation as the manifestation of some single principle which
they variously asserted to be movement, force, fire, moisture, or gen-
eration. In its simplest and most ancient sense Nature is precisely
the physical universe looked upon In this way as the manifestation of
a principle. Afterwards, the later Greek sects, returning to a path
from which the greatest intellects of Greece had meantime strayed,
added the moral to the physical world in the conception of Nature.
They extended the term until it embraced not merely the visible crea-
tion but the thoughts, observances and aspirations of mankind. Still,
as before, it was not solely the moral phenomena of human society
which they understood by Nature, -but the phenomena considered as
resolvable into some general and simple laws.
Now just as the oldest Grek theorists supposed that the sports
of chance had changed the material runiverse from its simple primitive
form into its present heterogeneous condition, so their intellectual
descendants imagined that but for untoward accident the human race
would have conformed itself to simpler rules of conduct and a less
tempestuous life. To live according to Nature was to rise above the
disorderly habits and gross Indulgences of the vulgar to higher laws
of action which nothing but self-denial and self-command would enable
the aspirant to observe. . . . Now on the subjugation of Greecec that
philosophy made Instantaneous progress in Roman Society. It pos-
sessed natural fascinations for the powerful class who, in theory,
at least, adhered to the simple habits of the ancient Italian race, and
disdained to surrender themselves to the innovations of foreign fash.
ion. Such persons began immediately to affect the Stoic precepts o;
life according to Nature-an affection all the more grateful, and, I
may add, all the more noble, from its contrast with the unbounded
profligancy which was being diffused through the imperial city by the
pillage of the world and by the example of its most luxurious races.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol10/iss3/2
THE LAWLESS LAW OF NATIONS
practice, of divine origin; the law of Nature became the
law of God. And there was biblical authority from the
Apostles Peter and Paul:
Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the
Lord's sake; whether it be to the Emperor, as supreme,
or unto Governors, as unto them that are sent by him
for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of
them that do well. For so is the will of God, that with
well-doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish
men.17
Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For
there is no power but of God; the powers that be are
ordained of God. Whoever, therefore, resisteth the power
resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall
secure to themselves damnation. 18
From the fifth to the fifteenth century, the divine origin
of law and government was hardly doubted. But it was not
a new idea; the Greeks bad deduced the control of the Deity
or Deities from the movements and processes of the material
universe, and had extended it to the affairs of men. The
jus gentium of the Romans was developing logically toward
that view before the dawn of Christianity, and when the
Christian era did come, the philosophic conception of the
system was readily adapted and expanded without shock.
The influence of Christianity upon law was not merely to
support authority, however; there was in it a potent force
working in quite the opposite direction. It preached the
17. I Peter, II. 13, 15.
18. Romans, XIII, 1, 2.
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supremacy of the eternal principles of morality which em-
perors must. obey and which the peoples themselves might
defend, even against their emperors; it, in fact, gave a sanc-
tion and a spirit to the principles of natural law and to in-
dividual responsibility, upon which today rest all that we
have to civil and religious liberty.
So tenaciously does this idea of the overruling character of
the law of Natlure persist, that we find Blackstone, in the
eighteenth century, declaring, in the words of Cicero, that-
-being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God him-
self, (it) is, of course, superior in obligation to any
other. It is binding over all the globe in all countries
and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if
contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive
all their force and all their authority, mediately or im-
mediately, from this original.'9
Yet he immediately qualifies that assertion in such a way
as to destroy its force by declaring that society implies gov-
ernment and there "must be in all of them a supreme ir-
resistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority in which the jura
summa imperii, or rights of Sovereignty reside."
Even as scholarly a modern as the late Viscount Bryce
was not wholly convinced that the Law of Nature is a mere
fiction, as the Analytical Jurists contend, which we may see
in the closing sentence of his essay bearing that title, where
he says:
Who can say that an idea so ancient, in itself simple,
yet capable of taking many aspects, an idea which has
19. Commentaries (Sharswood) I. Sec. II, 41.
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had so varied a history and so wide a range of influence,
may not have a career reserved for it in the long future
which still lies before the human race720
Although all modern writers on The Law of Nations assert
that that system could have had no existence until the birth
of that congeries of Sovereign States in 1648 by the Peace of
Westphalia, they inform us at the same time that the "Father
of the Law of Nations" is Hugo Grozius, a Dutch jurist, who,
while in exile at Senlis, in France, composed the first com-
prehensive work on the subject, De Jure Belli ac Pacic, pub-
lished in 1625, twenty-three years before that eventful Peace.
Thus Oppenheim says21 it has rightly been maintained that
no other work, with the single exception of the Bible, has ever
exercised a similar influence upon human minds, and that the
whole development of the modern Law of Nations takes root
from this forever famous book.
20. History and Jurisprudence.
21. I, Sec. 53. An anonymous contributor to the British Year Book of
International Law, 1920-1921, pp. 109-24, writing on The League of Nations
and The Laws of War, has this to say of the influence of Grotius' moral
system in the practical affairs of war:
Not only did his work have a great literary success but it was the
cause of an immediate and permanent improvement in the practices
of war. The atrocities of the Thirty Years' war were not reproduced
in the wars of the next tw~o centuries after he wrote... This positive
success made the moral force of the laws of war loom very large In the
minds of jurists, statesmen and peoples.
That Grotius was appalled by the utter chaos into which the ambitious
religious conflict, then raging, had thrown Europe, and sincerely sought
to point out a way to order may be seen in his introductory, where he says:
I, holding it to be most certain that there is among nations a com-
mon law of rights which is of force with regard to war and in war,
saw many and grave causes why I should write a work on that subject.
For I saw prevailinn throughout the Christian world a license in mak-
ing war of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed;
recourse being had to arms for slight reason or no reason; and, when
arms were once taken up, all reverence for divine and human law was
thrown away, just as if man were thenceforth authorized to commit
all crimes without restraint. Par. 28, Whewell's Trans.
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However that may be, the work is now an antiquarian curi-
osity to the modern legal scientist, and the most fruitful and
beneficent part of it,-that dealing with the obligations of
Natural law and reason,-is rejected as particularly per-
nicious by modern power-holders and their legal apologists.
Oppenheim, one of the most liberal of all of the prevailin.v
so-called Positivist school of writers, himself affirms 22 that
there is no doubt that, but for the Law of Nature, which
Grotius resurrected from the jus gentium, and the work of
his disciples, our modern constitutional law would not be
what it is; that is to say, men in civil society, would still
be without any natural rights as against their governments.
Grotius expounded The Law of Nations as embodying two
kinds of law, the natural and the voluntary. The former,
which he supported with the testimony of philosophers, his-
torians, poets, jurists and theologians of all ages, "is the
dictate of right reason, pronouncing that there is in some
actions a moral obligation, and in other actions a moral de-
formity, arising from their respective suitableness or repug-
nance to the rational and social nature, and that consequently,
such actions are either enjoined or forbidden by God, the
author of Nature." '23 The .law, which he distinguished as
"voluntary law." comprised such rules as had their origin
in the common consent of Sovereigns.
The world order in which he found himself, being dom-
inated by absolutism, though mired in the anarchy of the
Thirty Years' War, he perforce founded his international
community upon Sovereigns and Sovereign States. His notion
22. I, Sec. 53.
23. Book I, Chap I, Sec. X.
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of Sovereignty combined the internal aspect of supremacy
with the external aspect of independence, regulated and re-
strained, however, by that same Law of Nature which cir-
cumscribed the individual. Hence, in his view this interna-
tional system had the dual character of the Law of Nature
and of Nations.
Within half a century a worthy disciple appeared to carry
on the work of his great master, in Samuel P4fendorf, a
native of Saxony, who, in 1672, published De Jure Naturae
et Gentium, in which he denied that any voluntary, customary
or positive Law of Nations had the force of real law; that
the law of Nature, of reason and morality, alone held sway
between nations. So deep was the interest in this new system
of law that Pufendorf was called to the first chair of The
Law of Nature and Nations, instituted at Heidelberg in 1661.
In 1750 Christian Wolff, a German professor of law at the
University of Halle, brought out his Institutiones Juris
Naturae et Gentium, in which he visualized the coming of the
World-State or confederation. While stressing the Law of
Nature he also allowed validity to, and defined, three other
kinds of law,-the customary, the voluntary and the conven-
tional, the last created by treaties.
The last and most influential writer of this so-called Nat-
uralist School, which was clarifying and extending the message
of Grotius, was Emerich de Vattel, a Swiss citizen, in the
public service of Saxony, who, in 1758, published The Law of
Nations or The Principles of Natural Law Applied to the
Conduct and Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns.
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The inspiration for his work was drawn from Wolff, whose
treatise, written in Latin, could be known to be few. Vattel,
however, rejected the idea of a world-republic as the ultimate
consequence of natural law. The necessity for co-operation
and security has prompted men to form civil societies and the
natural law approves of that, he says, but there is by no
means the same necessity for a civil society among nations.
Yet Vattel concedes the need of a limited form of world
organization 24 in vindicating the right of all to unite to put
down violations of the law.
As to what this natural law is, that is equally binding upon
individuals and nations, the definition of Justinian 5 is ac-
cepted, as those rules established among all men by natural
reason; and again, Vattel describes it as "the immutable laws
of justice and the voice of conscience." Although Vattel was
the first writer on The Law of Nations to found the modern
State upon the free subjection of its equal citizens to the
public authority of the whole, in all that relates to the com-
mon good, he nevertheless had to reckon with the existence
of emperors and kings, possessing absolute power. His law
must, therefore, operate upon "nations and sovereigns," a
24. It is necessary for the reader to bear in mind that when Justinian's
Digest was promulgated at Byzantium, the seat of the eastern empire, the
people of Rome were in fact ruled by an Ostrogothic king, Athalarich,
grandson of Theodorich. And while the laws of Justinian speak in terms
indicating that their authority is from the people, the people had been under
the absolute rule of emperors for five centuries. Tribonian and his assis-
tants, who formulated the Corpus Juris Civilis at the order of Justinian, draw
all their norms from the language existing under the republicc, where the
people had actually legislated in their Comitia. With the coming of the
empire Augustus the change to absolutism was considered as conferred on
the emperor by the people, hence not inconsistent with the theory that they
were still the source of law. It is from the philosophy of the republic that
we get the three great precepts at the foundation of all law: to live honora-
bly, to hurt nobody, and to render to every man his due.
25. Book II, Chap. IV, Sec. 53. (Fenwick trans.): Intro. Sec. 22.
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coupling of terms appearing constantly in his treatise. Yet
he boldly denies that there can exist such a thing as "patri-
monial kingdom," admitted by Grotius and Wolff. This
pretended right of ownership attributed to princes is mere
fancy,26 he declares; the State is not and cannot be a patri-
mony, since a patrimony exists for the advantage of the
possessor, whereas the prince is appointed only for the good
of the State.
Vattel finds that there may exist a conventional Law of
Nations founded in treaties expressly, and a customary Law
of Nations, founded in long usage and tacit consent; yet both
of these draw their entire binding force from the natural law,
which demands that nations keep their compacts. Through-
out the whole branch of the subject dealing with the laws of
peace, he applies his principle of justice, morality and reason
with a courage remarkable for one of his time and situation.
In his treatment of the subject of war, he confined that
extreme right to cases of self defense, to put an end to in-
juries received or threatened, devoting an entire chapter to
"The Just Causes of War," in which he bitterly condemns
that Sovereign who, without necessity, wastes the blood of his
own subjects and heaps injustice upon those whom he attacks.
In that branch of the subject dealing with neuvrality he
appears as the first writer on The Law of Nations to dis-
tinguish clearly that the obligations of the neutral did not
allow mutual service or assistance to both belligerents, as was
then the practice, but consisted in abstention from service to
either,-a view now accepted with so man:? reservations as
still to be without practical value.
26. Book I, Sec. 61.
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The rules laid down by Vattel, while falling far short of
the demands of justice, morality and humanity, are neverthe-
less far in advance of the practices of St'ates, even in our own
day. Not the least of its achievements was its domination of
the political thought of the Unitled States from the foundation
of our government until the twentieth century, as expressive
of the true Law of Nations, and as distinguished from the
adverse practices of States. And it is to the influence of
Vattel alone that our own country owes its early reput'ation
as almost the only one on the globe that is animated by any
idealism in the furtherance of a just international legal sys-
tem.
The fault with Vattel, if it can be so termed, is that pointed
out by Professor de Lapradelle,2 7 in the introduction to the
Oarnegie Institution translation, as the difficulty of every
author who seeks to formulate a general conception of The
Law of Nations, namely: How to combine the subjection of
States to law with their Sovereignty, which does not recognize
any law over them.
Of course, no reconciliation is possible or ever will be. It
is only when States cease to be omnipotent that peoples will
be permitted to build up a system of law adequate to their
inter-relations, nor will their public relations loom so very
large in such a system. While the consul or commercial agent
would probably remain at his post, it is quite certain that the
gorgeous embassies, with their hosts of secretaries, and the
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body of private producers and thus reduce the army of public
consumers.
It is worth noting that the revolutionary work of Vattel
appeared in the midst of that great intellectual reaction which
began in France in the reign of Louis XV, against the ser-
vility of letters, enforced under his predecessors, and reached
its climax in the chaos that gave birth to the Declaration of
the Rights of Man by the French Constitutional Convention
in 1793. Vattel's volure was no more permitted to circulate
in Fraree, however, than were the works of Buffon, D'Alem-
bert, Dideret, La Harpe, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Voltaire,
all of w hom suffered fine or imprisonment or both, with the
burning of their writings by the public hangman.28 Vafte
must have been particularly offensive to the French monarchy,
inasmuch as he had preached the right of a people not' only
to depose, but actually to execute, a Sovereign turned tyrant.29
What is particularly remarkable about this period of ap-
parent triumph of the principles of natural law and of
natural rights,-that, it was hoped, would destroy the Sov-
ereigm attributes of every monarch in Europe and usher in a
universal constitutional order in every nation's internal af-
fairs,-is that it marks the abandoment of the doctrine of
28. Buckle, History of Civilization, I, Chap. XII.
29. Book I. Chap. IV.
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natural law in the development of The Law of Nations. o For
it was just at this time, by sinister coincidence, that the so-
called Positivist school of legal writers on The Law of Nations
took the field, attacking the validity of the law of nature as
no law at all, and at best, but ethics.3 1
The doctrine of natural rights was certainly pushed to a
terrifying excess in the French Revolution, and it is not to
be wondered at that the violence committed in its name under-
mined the faith in man of even so staunch a lover of his
kind as Edmund Burke. Whatever the cause of the reaction
the prophets of the new materialistic school appeared in the
persons of two Englishmen, Jeremy Bentham and John
30. The natural Law of Nations as expounded by Vattel was eagerly
accepted by our revolutionary forbears as complementary to the system
of natural rights which we were then vindicating in our war against
George III. Benjamin Franklin received three copies of Dumas' edition
in 1775, and wrote (Wharton's Dip. Cor. II, 6") that they "had been con-
tinually in the hands of the members of our Congress now sitting." How
fully we then belileved the Law of Nature to be the only true Law of Nations
may be further seen from the statement of Justice Wilson of the Supreme
Court (Ware vs. Hylton, 3 Dallas 199) in 1796, that: "When the United
States declared their Independence they were bound to receive the Law of
Nations in its modern state of purity and refinement."
The progress of natural law is thus viewed by Professor Pound (Spirit
of the Common Law, 89, 90):
What Is injury to another? What is it that constitutes anything
one's own? Grotius and his successors tried to answer by a theory
of natural rights; not merely natural law, as before, not merely prin-
ciples of eternal validity, but certain qualities inherent in persons
and demonstrated by reason and recognized by natural law, to which,
therefore, the natural law ought to give eifect. Thus, again, at the
very time that the victory of the courts in the contest beteween the
common law courts and th Stuart Kings had establlished that there
were common law rights of Englishmen which Englishmen might
maintain In courts and which courts would secure to them even
against the king, a juristic theory of fundamental natural rights in-
dependent of and running back of all states, which states might
secure and ought to secure but could not alter or abridge, had sprung
irn independently and was at hand to furnish a scientific explanation
when the next century called for one. By a natural transition the
Common Law limitations upon royal authority became natural limi-
titions upon all authority; the Common Law rights of Englishmen
became natural rights of man.
31. See Hershey's Essentials of Int. Pub. Law, Chap. I, See. 9.
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Austin, who preached that true law is a command proceeding
from a determinate rational being to which is annexed an
eventual evil or sanction, but that laws imposed by general
opinion are styled laws by an analogical extension of the
term, and are not positive laws; for every positive law is
prescribed by a given superior or Sovereign to a person or
persons in subjection to its author.32 In their theory coercive
power was an indispensible factor and they logically turned
to the sixteenth century and rehabilitated the absolutist con-
ceptions of Bodin and Hobbes of the limitless and uncon-
trollable power of Sovereigns as vital in the creation of true
law.
When Austin turned to consider the rules of The Law of
Nature and Nations, he could find no overruling world army
and navy to enforce them; hence he denied that there existed
any true Law of Nations. Austin had spent a part of his
youth in the army, on leaving which he studied law at Heidel-
berg and Bonn, where he imbibed deeply the spirit of the
Roman law. It is not surprising that his doctrines, so agree-
able to autocratic authority, should have been favorably re-
ceived and encouraged by governments, but it is puzzling that
so many so-called legal scientists, in no way the stipendiaries
of government, should continue blindly to accept them.
Writers on The Law of Nations henceforth, abandoning
Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel, seek some other basis than
reason or natural law as the foundation for their system in
order to square it with Austinian postulates. The works of
32. See Bentham, Morals and Legislation, II; Austin, Province of Juris-
prudence, Loct. VI.
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the Dutch jurist Bynkershoek33 lent themselves to this end.
In his theory The Law of Nations was founded either in
custom or in convention; there was no other law between
nations than these tacit and express kinds. As to its sanction
-Austin's coercive element-we are assured that it is found
in retaliation or war undertaken by one Sovereign State
against -another that bad violated the law. Thus the right
of violence and war became formally justified in the system
of Sovereign States.
Clearly, the so-called customary and conventional Law of
Nations, of the Positivists, is in no sense commanded from
above, since Sovereignty excludes the idea of a superior; as
for the sanction or coercive element in retaliation and war,
that is available only to the strong against the weak. While
the Positivists do not mention this, it is easy to deduce from
Austin 's society of irresponsible Sovereign and docile subject,
that the necessary element of coercion is in practice but a
measure for the strong against the weak, and that, therefore,
in the Society of Nations, the Great Powers, who now keep
the little one5 in order, do, in fact, command that their so-
called customary and conventional law.
What else does "the'political hegemony of the Greav Pow-
ers" mean? Oppenheim tells us that, though all Sovereign
States are equal, nevertheless, "all arrangements made by the
body of the Great Powers naturally gain the consent of the
minor states." 34
33. Cornelius van Bynkerstock (1673-1743) De dominlo marls, 1702;
De foro legatorum, 1721; Questionum juris publici libri II, 1737.
34. Int. Law I, Chap II, Sec. 116. Wheaton tells us (International
Law, Part II, Chap. II, Sec. 152, Dana, 1866) that "the natural equal-
ity of sovereign states may be modified by positive compact or 'by con-
sent implied from constant wurage, so as to entitle one state to superi-
ority over another in respect to certain external objects, such as rank,
titles, and other ceremonial distinction. Thus the International Law of
Europe has attributed to certain states what are called royal honors, aetc."
These honors are now accorded to the Great Powers.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol10/iss3/2
THE LAWLESS LAW OF NATIONS
From the nineteenth century onward we are assured by a
constant succession of so-called international authorities that
The Law of Nations is founded first, in the practices of Sov-
ereign States, a plurality of like acts thereby creating cus-
tomary law; and second, in treaties, special and general,
thereby creating special or general conventional law. Whether
these practices and treaties are moral or immoral, just or
unjust, whether they violate reason or the natural law. is no
longer the concern of legal science, the Positivist writers tell
us. Morality, justice, humanity,-these are terms known to
ethics but no longer known to The Law of Nations since its
divorce from the Law of Nature. Thus Austin asserts that
a law may be unjust but it is nevertheless binding; wherefore
to resist it may be virtuous but can never be legally rizht.35
And as late authority as Sir Frederick Pollock declares:
Though much ground is common to both, the subject-
matter of law and ethics is not the same. The field of
legal rules of conduct does not coincide with that of
moral rules, and is not included in it; and the purposes
for which they exist are distinct.3 6
By the same process of reasoning that deduces the exist-
ence of a valid rule of The Law of Nations from the like
practices of Sovereign States and clothes any act, however
outrageous with the sanctity of law as soon as there are imi-
tators, the repeated bank robberies and other crimes inflicted
upon us would repeal our Criminal Codes. Lorimer is the
only outstanding author who has perceived this absurdity.
35. Lect. VI, 275.
36. First Book of Jurisprudence, 44.
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He says:
There are many forms of crimes and folly which differ
from ordinary crimes and follies only in that, being com-
mitted by large numbers of persons simultaneously, they
partake of the character of customs. Customs of this
class, though as reactions against each other they oc-
casionally yield a resultant which becomes a source of
law, have in themselves no claim to that character. Agrag-
rian or communistic outrages are not sources of law,
even in cases in which they lead to more accurate defini-
tions of the natural rights of persons or the limits of
private property8 s7
Elsewhere Lorimer posits this unanswerable argument;
It is obvious that, as there is no intermediate region
of indifference between justice and injustice, so there can
be no jural relations which are partly normal and partly
abnormal. Indifferences between related entities is a con-
tradiction in terms-an attitude which is not abnormal
alone, but anti-jural--which carries us out of jurispru-
dence altogether.38
But he immediately attacks the foregoing argument in these
incomprehensible words:
In consequence of their abnormality they are right
relatively only, not absolutely-temporarily, not perma-
nently. They are right only in relation to conditions that
are wrong, because not wholly independent of human
volition.
Then he wavers, as thoaugh not quite convinced that con-
ditions that are wrong can be the source of rights, saying:
31. Institutes of The Law of Nations, Chap. II, 32.
35. Ibid. I, 6,. 7.
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But these conditions are not natural phenomena, either
ordinary, like the changes of the seasons, the alterations
of day and night and the processes of growth and decay;
or extraordinary, like earthquakes and thunderstorms.
They are aberrations from the natural life of man-un-
natural phenomena like preventable disease-the exist-
ence of which and of their consequences, can be jurally
recognized only with a view to their removal. A system
of jurisprudence which rests on the assumption of the
fundamental rectitude of human nature, this admits the
laws of belligerency and neutrality only conditionally
and under protest.
Without fully comprehending its profound truth Lorimer
presents this definition of The Law of Nations:
But we have seen that the perfect relation of all sepa-
rate rational entities, when realized, is freedom-liberty
to be and to develop themselves in accordance with their
idea, or in other words, with the special character which
their nature has assigned to them. Assuming this to be
so, The Law of Nations may be further and more spe-
cifically defined as:
The realization of freedom of separate nations.3 9
He failed to perceive that the prevailing system means
freedom only for the Sovereign States-the dominant poli-
ticians composing their governments-and subjection for the
nations themselves. However, Lorimer was progressive-rela-
tively; none of his predecessors since Vattel, or his succes-
sors, questioned the jural character of abnormal relations be-
tween Sovereign States.
39. Ibid. I, 1, 2.
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The authors of this profound change in the system of The
Law of Nations from a highly moral one, promising much fpr
human liberty, to a grossly material one, have at their head
with Bynkershoek, two German contemporaries, Jo-hann Jakob
Moser and Georg Frederich von Martens, who constitute the
founders of the prevailing Positivist school. Thus Bynker-
shoek declares:
The Law of Nations is only a presumption founded
upon usage, and every such presumption ceases the mo-
ment the will of the party who is affected by it is ex-
pressed to the contrary. °
As for the law of Nature or the principles of justice and
morality, or natural reason, they can become law, he affirms,
only through positive adoption in practice and are without
validity in themselves, for-
We must now see what usage has approved; that must
prevail, since the Law of Nations is thence derived.41
Usage and custom are unquestionably the source of law,
and of the truest law, because of its evolution from below
rather than from its imposition from above, but a society of
free individuals is something quite different from a group of
omnipotent States, armed to the teeth and empowered to sac-
rafice the lives of all their able-bodied citizens in their own
good pleasure. In man's individual societies no law, cus-
tomary or statutory, has any validity if opposed to the recog-
nized laws of morality and justice. Among every civilized
40. De foro legatorum, Chap. 7, Sec. VIII.
41. Ibid.
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people a law that is contra bonos mores ;s void. Violations
of the moral law are not punished by ostracism alone, they are
frequently considered legal wrongs, and some have legal con-
sequences such as removal from office, statutory deprivation
of civil rights, disciplinary correction and criminal punish-
ment.4
2
It may be asserted, therefore, that though the legal scien-
tists in the international field have succeeded in their treaties
in separating the legal law from the moral, the former is
tending to approximate the latter in our national systems
with a constancy that promises their ultimate reconciliation.
The law of Nature, which embraces the terms morality,
justice and reason, is entirely too vague to form the basis of
any Law of Nations, the Positivist writers tells us, yet the law
of Nature of the Greeks and the Romans has its counterpart
in the English common law in its constant deference to reason
and reasonableness. In the law of sales, for example, a con-
troversy over price is solved by appeal to what is reasonable;
reasonable care and what a reasonable man would do in the
'ircumstances, are old and familiar ideas.
Though we speak of a violation of the laws of Nature, the
phrase means generally that an act in disregard of a certain
sequence of phenomena, in the animate or inanimate world,
involves an inevitable consequence in the nature of a penalty.
No governmental power is necessary to enforce this penalty;
it is quite as potent in chastising governments and nations as
individual men when disregarded. The affliction and misery
of man in political society reveal this clearly enough. As
42. Garels, Science of Law, Sees. 6, 47.
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Montesquieu. long ago said,43 those who assert that a blind
fatality produced the various effects we behold in this world
talk very loosely; for can anything be more unreasonable
than to pretend that a blind fatality could be productive of
intelligent beings?
There is then, in this sense, a natural Law of Nations, quite
distinct from those rules of convenience and that adjective
and so-called customary and conventional law, which monop-
olize the attention of textwriters. It is the same law, which,
according as it is confirmed to or disregarded, unites or sep-
arates men in families, families in nations and nations in the
great world society. Whether we call it natural law or nat-
ural reason, or the principles of justice, morality and hu-
manity, it is undeniable that, if it acts in the individual
relations of man, it operates as fully in his collective relations.
If these general terms are still too vague, it is admittedly pos-
sible for men and nations to live honorably, to injure no one
and to render to every man his due. That can be compre-
hended by even the dullest mind.
However, as has been pointed out, the only so-called law
known to Sovereign States today is of two kinds, the cus-
tomary and the conventional. The latter may lJroperly be
termed law since it is founded in the obligation of treaties;
and treaties between States are nothing but contracts which
may make good special or general law, according as they are
43. The Spirit of Laws, Chap. I, 1 (Nugent trans.). While not a legal
philosopher it is nevertheless interesting to find Schopenhauer saying:
The conceptions right and wrong as equivalent to Injury and non-
injury, are obviously independent of positive legislation and antece-
dent to it. Thus there exists a pure ethical or natural law and a
pure science of law independent of all statutes. Preisschrift uber die
Grundlage der Moral (Griesbach) I1, 598,
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limited by the same general principles which limit contracts
betwen man and man. Unfortunately the international con-
tract is not so limited. As to the alleged customary law,
founded in the practices of Sovereign States in denial and
defiance of all community restraint, springing from uncom-
trollable self-assertion and recognizing no principles of jus-
tice and morality as of restraining force,-this is mere cari-
cature of law. It can be considered law only if it is possible
to conceive of a law of lawlessness or of an order of disorder.
As Jackson H. Ralson has pointedly said in his admirable
little volume, Democracy's International Law:
If a thousand times men have been overcome by their
enemies and despoiled of their pocketbooks, there is not
thereby created a law of robbery. A thousand like in-
stances between nations cannot create a law of war sanc-
tioning such conduct. The fact that under given cir-
cumstances men or nations have taken advantage of one
another does not create a law of wrongdoing, but only
indicates a tendency on their part, their passions being
excited, to ignore the laws of decency.44
While Mr. Ralston appears to blame the nations for thus
having created a spurious law of international robbery, they
are actually but secondarily culpable. For the instincts of
peoples are, in the main, fair and honorable and their love
of peace is a genuine one. The phenomena of war and
violence, constantly afflicting the earth, are not of their
origination-the necessity for the conscription of armies re-
veals this plainly enough-but are the product of the indulg-
44. Chap. III, 35.
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ence of the vices of power by their governments; they follow
the adventures of the Sovereign State, with which the people
are denied any connection but for which they are compelled
to make every sacrifice. So long, however, as people permit
a few of their number, deceptively garbed as Sovereign
States, to wield so awful a power, they cannot escape some
measure of responsibility.
Many suggestions of the advisability of codifying The Law
of Nations have been put forward in recent times but it must
now be clear that a system so essentially vicious cannot be
codified without stereotyping the most grievous wrongs. Codi-
fication of law, even nationally, as we find it in our statutes,
is largely an artificial device working in the interest of the
power-holders and against that of the citizen. It is custom
alone,-the freely developed usages of society,--that has any
elasticity and that alone maintains a close connection with
the sources of law. Statute law can be maintained only by
the constant action of a legislature, which, it is devoutly to
be hoped, will never be imposed upon man universally. The
warning is very clear in our individual societies where, as
Lomimer remarks,45 obsolete law has a tendency to become en-
crusted in a mass. of intricate technicality from which it is
exceedingly difficult for common-sense or common honesty to
dislodge it. It can do notking to advance jurisprudence; it
actually retards progress since every step in advance is a
violation of the code.
45. Institutes Chap. I, 35.
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